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62 
ON THE ROLE AND REGULATION  




In anticipation of proxy season—the springtime ritual where companies 
prepare and deliver proxy statements in preparation for annual shareholder 
meetings—U.S. public companies typically reexamine their corporate go-
vernance structures and policies. Many corporate governance structures that 
were acceptable ten years ago are now considered outmoded or even evi-
dence of managerial entrenchment. For example, consider the classified 
board of directors. In recent years, many companies have shifted from a 
classified board of directors to an annually elected board. A company might 
adopt an annually-elected board structure for a number of reasons. A classi-
fied board can serve as an entrenchment device, for instance, and so the 
company may hope to increase the accountability to shareholders that such a 
structure entails. Likewise, there may be legitimate reasons to retain a clas-
sified board of directors, such as the negotiating leverage a classified 
structure provides the board in the context of a hostile takeover. As a com-
pany considers such a change, however, high-minded considerations of the 
optimal governance structure do not always, and probably do not regularly, 
drive the discussion. Instead, the primary consideration is often that Institu-
tional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) or another proxy advisor is opposed to 
classified boards, and the firm feels compelled to make the change in order 
to improve its corporate governance rating even though the change may 
have no beneficial effect on the firm’s corporate governance or perfor-
mance. 
I have heard a number of similar tail-wagging-the-dog stories repeated 
by corporate counsel and public company officers and directors, usually 
expressed with frustration over some proxy advisors’ approach to gover-
nance—particularly with respect to those firms adopting what seems to be a 
one-size-fits-all methodology for evaluating corporate governance. The role 
of proxy advisors has increasing relevance because the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has recently undertaken a review of the mechanisms of 
proxy voting—less gracefully but perhaps aptly described as “proxy plumb-
ing”—and the role of proxy advisors in that process. Commentators have 
identified a number of concerns with proxy advisors and the corporate go-
vernance industry in which they operate. One is the inherent conflict of 
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interest in the business model of many of these firms—providing gover-
nance advice to corporate clients while also providing voting advice to 
investor clients—which gives reason to doubt the accuracy of their ratings 
and advice.1
I. THE VALUE OF PROXY ADVISORS 
 Compounding this problem is the fact that figuring out exactly 
what matters in corporate governance is quite difficult.  
We have some evidence that some metrics used by ratings firms can 
meaningfully predict performance, but at least some of these studies were 
commissioned by the subject ratings firms themselves.2 Other independent 
work suggests that the ratings used by various firms do not accurately pre-
dict firm performance.3 To emphasize the obvious, these firms are, after all, 
businesses. They must have something of value to offer their clients, and 
they must differentiate their products. It would be problematic for these 
firms if something basic—for example, share ownership by independent 
directors, as Professors Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano suggest—is a more 
reliable predictor of performance than the rating firms’ multitude of metrics. 
A simple, single metric could be produced by the clients—institutional in-
vestors—relatively cheaply. Instead, ratings firms offer a profusion of 
proprietary rating systems, each constantly tweaked and recalibrated—a 
process that could be described as “methodology churn”. No two are alike, 
although the ratings are often offered as though there were a single grand 
unified theory of corporate governance, perfectly expressed by their proprie-
tary methodology. Even Professor Bebchuk, whom I think it is fair to say is 
allied with governance ratings firms in the general goal of promoting share-
holder empowerment, has argued that ratings that try to impose a great 
number of “good governance” metrics on firms are less useful predictors 
than simply keying on a few problematic entrenchment devices such as poi-
son pills. In other words, it seems easier to spot “bad governance” structures 
than it is to effectively prescribe “good governance” structures.4
If we doubt at least some of firms’ ability to make useful firm perfor-
mance predictions, the interesting question then is why anyone buys what 
they are selling. Scholars and other observers have offered several non-
 
                                                                                                                      
 1. RiskMetrics’ 2009 annual report acknowledges this problem, stating that the “per-
ceived conflict of interest between the services we provide to institutional clients and the 
services, including our Compensation Advisory Services, provided to certain corporate clients” 
must be managed. RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22 (2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1295172/000104746910001246/a2196648z10-k.htm. It 
admits that “in the event that we fail to adequately manage these perceived conflicts of interest, 
we could incur reputational damage.” Id. 
 2. E.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1803 (2008). 
 3. Robert Daines, et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Rat-
ings? (Stan. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 360, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1152093. 
 4. Lucien Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 
783, (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=593423. 
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exclusive reasons. First, investors buy ratings simply to obtain the underly-
ing data. This seems plausible, since it is indeed costly for individual 
investors to collect data on firms, and governance ratings firms provide this 
very useful service more efficiently.5 Second, firms buy ratings as protec-
tion against future claims of breach of fiduciary duty, or even merely as, in 
the words of Professor Ribstein, “criticism insurance.”6
A third possibility is that independent researchers are wrong, and that at 
least some ratings firms do have accurate models and metrics. Even without 
the benefit of research on particular ratings models, we know that some of 
them must be wrong because they often do not agree on whether a particular 
firm has “good” governance. Over the long term hopefully we will see that 
ratings produced by firms that engage in detailed, company-specific re-
search will outperform ratings that apply a one-size-fits-all approach to 
ratings. Finally, Professors Calomiris and Mason also suggest in a recent 
paper that institutional investors may prefer a distracting and “noisy” signal
 I agree that this is 
an important, and perhaps the primary, reason why firms buy the ratings. In 
response to concerns that managers were too powerful and imposed high 
agency costs on firms, academics and regulators in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
increasingly pushed the idea that dedicated institutional investors could re-
duce these costs by better monitoring. However, monitoring is costly, and 
few institutional investors other than CalPERS were willing to expend re-
sources on monitoring from which they could only expect to extract a small, 
pro-rata gain. Regulators incentivized institutional investors to dedicate re-
sources to monitoring efforts by underscoring that proxy voting is a 
fiduciary duty. As a market response, the corporate governance ratings in-
dustry developed into the force we are discussing today. 
7 
because “low-quality ratings make it harder to hold them accountable for 
poor decision making or poor outcomes associated with those investment 
decisions.”8
Let me offer another possible reason, perhaps related to the “noise” hy-
pothesis, why some institutional investors might value corporate governance 
ratings even if they have little or no value in predicting firm performance. 
This reason should inform not just potential regulation of proxy advisory 
firms, but also rulemaking that empowers shareholders. In recent years, the 
corporate governance ratings industry has eroded directorial and managerial 
power and enhanced shareholder power. Even if ISS, for example, is wrong 
that a particular firm should have an annually elected board, as a general 
matter institutional investors (at least those that tend to be activist share-
  
                                                                                                                      
 5. This conclusion is also supported with evidence supplied by Stephen Choi, Jil Fisch and 
Marcel Kahan in Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2009), 
available at http://weblaw.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/lawreview/documents/ChoiforWebsite.pdf. 
 6. Larry Ribstein, Larry Ribstein on The Corporate Governance Industry, The Conglome-
rate, June 12, 2006, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/06/the_corporate_g.html. 
 7. Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, Conflicts of Interest, Low Quality Ratings, and 
Meaningful Reform of Credit and Corporate Governance Ratings, e21, Apr. 19, 2010, at 7, available at 
http://economics21.org/files/pdfs/commentary/04_19_2010_calomiris_mason_governance.pdf.  
 8. Id. at 12. 
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holders, such as some pension funds) have an interest in a powerful ratings 
industry that is allied with institutional investor power. It is no coincidence 
that aggressive, activist investors are affecting corporate decisions with in-
creasing success in recent years—the rise of the corporate governance 
industry has made such activity inevitable. Although the initial goal of the 
shareholder empowerment movement—to reduce wasteful agency costs by 
shirking managers and directors—appears benign, the crucial issue is 
whether such enhanced shareholder power is being used to support long-
term prosperity or is instead focused on short term gains. I fear that it is of-
ten being used for short term gains. And powerful shareholders may use 
their influence to extract gains at the expense of less powerful, less activist 
shareholders, such as retail investors. Rather than ultimately reducing agen-
cy costs from management shirking, we instead have a new set of agency 
costs borne by small investors and perhaps also by the beneficial owners of 
the activist funds that do not share in the particular gains enjoyed by the 
fund’s management. 
II. ENCOURAGING BETTER-QUALITY RATINGS BY PROXY ADVISORS 
The corporate governance ratings industry itself is a market response: 
firms effectively resolve the collective action problem faced by institutional 
investors who have a fiduciary duty to vote proxies in the best interests of 
their beneficiaries. But the market for governance ratings is not working as 
it should: ratings firms produce poor-quality ratings whose validity cannot 
be tested because the underlying metrics are proprietary and are not dis-
closed. Even if they were disclosed, it is likely that we would end up merely 
assuring ourselves that none of them are very useful.  
Arguably, increased competition will encourage users of ratings to “vote 
with their feet.” My first inclination is that a purely market-driven response 
is preferable; again, depending on the availability data, firms producing one-
size-fits-all ratings (which almost surely benefit from cheaply producing 
poor quality ratings) may be shown to underperform based on empirically 
sound company and issue-specific analysis. Firms that produce poor-quality 
ratings will be exposed and investors will vote with their feet. However, 
market pressures may not be as robust as we might like, because a signifi-
cant portion of investors may be either (1) hiring a corporate governance 
ratings firm merely as a kind of insurance against fiduciary breach claims or 
criticism (which would probably support hiring the market leader: if a ma-
jority of funds hires ISS, ISS appears to be the safest choice, which 
perpetuates their advantage); or (2) the investors are indifferent to whether 
the advice results in better long term financial performance, but instead are 
interested in acquiring more leverage against boards and management in 
order to pursue short term or private gains.  
If the market indeed is resistant to change through normal competitive 
pressures, we should then turn to other pressure points in the market. Per-
haps potential liability for ratings firms could protect against poor quality 
ratings. Potential liability could take the form of SEC rules governing dis-
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closure of methodologies of governance ratings firms, similar to the new 
rules applicable to credit ratings agencies. I also assume that poor quality 
should be more easily detected with enhanced disclosure of methodology 
even if, as with the credit rating agency rules, only a “sufficiently detailed” 
description of the methodology is produced. The danger with SEC regula-
tion of corporate governance ratings is that, similar to what happened with 
the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, the SEC risks 
simply entrenching market leadership. The SEC could reduce this risk by 
taking the position that one-size-fits-all methodologies are not appropriate, 
of course, but that seems out of step with current regulatory trends. 
Another pressure point is the institutional investor client of corporate 
governance ratings firms. If these investors do indeed have a fiduciary duty 
to their beneficiaries, that duty should not be assumed to have been met by a 
casual acceptance of a proxy recommendation without some assurance that 
the mechanisms that produced the recommendation are both reliable and 
free of conflict. The SEC has spoken to the conflicts issue in a pair of letters 
to ISS and Egan-Jones. The ISS letter states:  
Consistent with its fiduciary duty, an investment adviser should take rea-
sonable steps to ensure that, among other things, the [proxy advisory firm] 
can make recommendations for voting proxies in an impartial manner and 
in the best interests of the adviser’s clients. Those steps may include a case 
by case evaluation of the proxy voting firm’s relationships with Issuers, a 
thorough [emphasis added] review of the proxy voting firm’s conflict pro-
cedures and the effectiveness of their implementation, and/or other means 
reasonably designed to ensure the integrity of the proxy voting process . . . 
When reviewing a proxy voting firm’s conflict procedures, an investment 
adviser should assess the adequacy of those procedures in light of the par-
ticular conflicts of interest that the firm faces in making voting 
recommendations. An investment adviser should have a thorough under-
standing of the proxy voting firm’s business and the nature of the conflicts 
of interest that the business presents, and should assess whether the firm’s 
conflict procedures negate the conflicts. The investment adviser should al-
so assess whether the proxy voting firm has fully implemented the conflict 
procedures.9
There is anecdotal evidence that some large public funds left ISS for 
other ratings firms because of ISS’s potential for conflicts. However, ISS’s 
efforts to develop a firewall between its corporate and investor advisory 
groups has likely reassured many investors, as suggested by the 2007 GAO 
report on proxy advisors, which stated: 
 
All of the institutional investors—both large and small—we spoke with 
that subscribe to ISS’s services said that they are satisfied with the steps 
that ISS has taken to mitigate its potential conflicts. Most institutional in-
vestors also reported conducting due diligence to obtain reasonable 
assurance that ISS or any other proxy advisory firm is independent and 
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free from conflicts of interest. As part of this process, many of these insti-
tutional investors said they review ISS’s conflict policies and periodically 
meet with ISS representatives to discuss these policies and any changes to 
ISS’s business that could create additional conflicts.10
I suspect that some—maybe most—of these investors conduct due dili-
gence on conflicts by merely reading ISS’s statement that it is free from 
conflicts created by its corporate and investor advisory businesses. If that is 
true, then those firms do not appear to be complying with the guidance of-
fered by the SEC. Furthermore, as the GAO’s report points out, the possible 
conflict between a proxy advisor’s corporate and investor advisory busi-
nesses is just one of several potential conflicts. According to the GAO, other 
possible conflicts include: 
 
1. Owners or executives of proxy advisory firms may have a significant 
ownership interest in or serve on the board of directors of corporations 
that have proposals on which the firms are offering vote recommenda-
tions.  
2. Institutional investors may submit shareholder proposals to be voted on 
at corporate shareholder meetings. This raises a concern that proxy ad-
visory firms will make favorable recommendations to other institutional 
investor clients on such proposals in order to maintain the business of 
the investor clients that submitted these proposals.  
3. Several proxy advisory firms are owned by companies that offer other 
financial services to various types of clients, as is common in the finan-
cial services industry.11
Given the voting power of active institutional investors, the SEC has fo-
cused relatively little attention on enforcing the fiduciary duties created by 
its proxy voting rules. To give the SEC some credit, in 2009 it brought a 
case alleging breach of fiduciary duty with respect to proxy voting against 
INTECH, a registered investment adviser.
 
12
                                                                                                                      
 10. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-76, Report to Congressional Requesters: Issues 
Relating to Firms That Advise Institutional Investors on Proxy Voting (June 2007), at 11, available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07765.pdf. 
 INTECH engaged ISS to vote 
proxies in accordance with AFL-CIO proxy voting recommendations. Ac-
cording to the SEC,
 
INTECH followed the AFL-CIO recommendations 
because it was participating in the annual AFL-CIO key votes survey that 
ranked investment advisers based on their adherence to the AFL-CIO’s rec-
ommendations. INTECH hoped that improving its ranking in the AFL-CIO 
survey would help it maintain existing union clients and recruit new ones. 
INTECH failed to note in its disclosures the material conflict of interest be-
tween INTECH and its clients who did not share the AFL-CIO’s voting 
policies. Indeed, in its proxy voting policies INTECH noted that because it 
 11. Id. at 11-12. 
 12. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Investment Adviser 
for Proxy Voting Rule Violations (May 8, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/ 
2009-105.htm. 
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relied on ISS, it did not “expect[] that any conflicts w[ould] arise in the 
proxy voting process.”13
In the end, despite guidance such as the ISS letter, I think the SEC has 
not adequately encouraged investors to scrutinize not just potential conflicts 
of interest, but also the content of the advice they receive from corporate 
governance raters and proxy advisors. Unless the SEC provides better guid-
ance on what such scrutiny should entail and undertakes a sustained 
enforcement program to detect and discipline fiduciaries who fail to meet 
their duties, the beneficiaries of the funds these institutional investors man-
age will suffer. 
 
Finally, poor quality ratings by corporate governance ratings firms have 
serious consequences not just for the investors who purchase deficient rat-
ings and advice, but also for the economy as a whole. Capital is allocated 
and crucial corporate governance decisions are often driven on the basis of 
these ratings and advice. An executive of a corporate governance ratings 
firm once described advising institutional investors as akin to herding cats. 
While that may often be true (and let us hope that it is, because it suggests 
that at least some are not blindly accepting ratings and advice), these firms 
still wield significant influence over institutional investors, as proxy solici-
tors and corporate secretaries assert. This influence is not always evident in 
proxy voting; indeed, the traces of the influence are probably more likely to 
appear in the corporate governance choices of public companies from year 
to year.. It is not a stretch to say that corporate governance ratings firms 
serve as a de facto regulator, with some firms offering a set of one-size-fits-
all best practices that directors and executives ignore at their peril. 
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